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Summary
This is a case study of goldsmith craft apprenticeship
learning and recognition. The study includes 13 par-
ticipants in a goldsmith’s workshop. The theoretical
approach to recognition and learning is inspired by
sociocultural theory. In this article recognition is defined
with reference to Hegel’s understanding of the concept
as a transformed struggle of granting acknowledgement
to another person plus receiving acknowledgement as
a person. It is argued that the notion of recognition can
enhance sociocultural notions of learning. In analysing
the case study of apprenticeship learning, the article
suggests that recognition is expressed in the act of
participants staking their lives to prove their autonomy,
in work activity in terms of the role of artefacts and in
the form of abstract and concrete recognition. Finally
recognition is discussed in relation to learning and de-
velopment. The study concludes that recognition is an
important category not only to explain apprenticeship
learning but also to give a sociocultural explanation of
learning in general.
1 Introduction
Recognition (“Anerkennung” in German)
refers briefly speaking to an act of granting
acknowledgement to another person plus re-
ceiving acknowledgement as a person. This
paper couples recognition with learning and
development.
Learning and development – becoming
someone through participating in cultural his-
torical activity – can be seen as cultural de-
velopment towards self-mastery (Vygotsky,
1998: 171). According to Vygotsky this mas-
tery was built on the notion of consciousness
as mediated and on the idea that the person
must “carry out activities that force him to rise
above himself” (Vygotsky, 1987: 213). While
this notion of mastery, as argued later, can be
seen in connection with recognition, sociocul-
tural approaches to learning have generally
not paid great attention to Hegel’s notion of
recognition.
Packer and Goicoechea (2000) present
the only sociocultural theory that explicitly
links learning, personality development and
recognition. Packer and Goicoechea suggest
a model where the person is constructed in a
social context shaped through practical activ-
ity and formed in relationships of desire and
recognition. These relationships can also serve
to split or alienate the person thus motivating
a construction of identity interwoven with the
person’s place and participation in the social
world (Lave & Wenger, 1991: 53). This means
that identity change or person formation can
be conceived with recourse to a struggle for
recognition.
When pondering how we achieve mastery
of self (including the process of mastery of self
mediated by others as well as cultural tools) this
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article will suggest that we must look for strug-
gles for recognition since this struggle goes be-
fore personality development. The article ar-
gues that recognition is an important concept
for sociocultural approaches to learning in gen-
eral and apprenticeship learning in particular.
The hypothesis is that learning should be con-
ceived in terms of intersubjectively and insti-
tutionally mediated recognition.
This article reports a case study of Dan-
ish goldsmith craft apprenticeship learning1.
The case was apprenticeship learning at Bent
Exner’s goldsmith workshop. Bent Exner was,
as elaborated later, a well-known artisan who
lives in Northern Jutland, Denmark. The case
study investigates how apprentices, journey-
women and the master appeal to each other
and struggle to grant and receive recognition
from each other. The participants of the case
study were: Bent Exner (the master) and 12
former apprentices (seven females and five
males). This sample made up for all apprentic-
es (except one male who had emigrated) who
had graduated from the master’s workshop.
2 Recognition and learning
This section will introduce Hegel’s notion of
recognition. Then a sociocultural approach to
learning and recognition will be discussed.
Hegel’s notion of recognition
Hegel explicated his account of recognition
in several unpublished and published works
during his lifetime. However, this article will
concentrate mainly on Hegel’s account of
 1 In Denmark goldsmith craft training is part of the vo-
cational educational system governed by the Ministry
of Education and enacted by the Danish Goldsmith
College, which is part of Copenhagen Technical School.
Danish vocational education is a dual educational sys-
tem interchanging between school and workshop peri-
ods. Periods spent working in the workshop comprise
the bulk of the 4 years of training; thus apprenticeship
learning is an important aspect of goldsmith vocational
educational training.
recognition in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”
from 1807 (Hegel, 1977) with a brief detour
to the “Philosophy of Right” from 1820/1821
(Hegel, 1991). Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit initially (sections I-III) traces how an
observer has desires that provide him with
certainty that he is neither a passive observer
of the world nor an observer of his representa-
tions about the world, but in fact an agent or
self situated in the world (as argued in section
IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit). But this
certainty of self leads to a clash between two
agents; not so much in terms of a struggle
over desires where one agent tries to make
the other agent a tool to satisfy his desire, but
rather as a struggle to ensure self-determina-
tion or self-autonomy. Each agent wants to
prove that he is an autonomous person, who
independently determines which relations to
the world (including his desires) to take as
legitimate. This causes the agent to engage
in a life-and-death struggle – a primordial
fight not only to seek the death of the other,
but also to prove the agent’s willingness to
give up his life.
This struggle is resolved in the transforma-
tion or sublation2 of the agents’ desires and
the resulting formation of self-consciousness
as the agents mutually recognise each other.
Self-consciousness emerges due to the need
for self-recognition that is not met by merely
devouring objects (e.g. food or selves as in the
life-and-death struggle mentioned above). The
agent’s desire turns out not to be merely direct-
ed towards objects, but towards the other. The
other self, who cannot be killed or devoured if
it is to be a self, performs its acknowledging
act of the agent’s self. The resolution of this
dilemma is expressed in the double-relation
of a) respecting or acknowledging the autono-
mous status of an other person and b) of being
 2 The term in German “Aufhebung” means to cancel and
preserve at the same time by integrating and arriving
at a new totality.
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respected or acknowledged as such a person
in return.
Hegel (1977: 111) explicitly stated that mu-
tual recognition was a necessary condition for
the formation of self-consciousness since it
only exists by being recognised by another
and in return recognising this other person.
The course of the person’s struggle to be taken
for an autonomous agent is represented in the
institution of mastery-slavery that represents
the most rudimentary or primitive form of rec-
ognition. The formation of self-consciousness
surpasses the institution of mastery-slavery
(and the master-slave relation) in two ways.
First, once we move beyond it, participants
become somebody to each other and not mere
objects of someone’s desire (O’Neill, 1996).
Second, Hegel (1991: §35) distinguishes be-
tween abstract and concrete personality. Rec-
ognition on one level mediates abstract person-
ality understood as the formation of the person
as endowed with rights on a legal level. But
recognition also mediates concrete personality
expressed through acts of love and friendship
(Williams, 1992: 183). In friendship and love,
the individual wins her concrete personality by
giving up her abstract personality.
While Hegel’s (1977) notion of recogni-
tion is situated in the intersubjective bonds
between two agents, recognition is also ex-
pressed in more developed social practices
where communal agents struggle to grant or
receive recognition. Thus sections V-VII in
the Phenomenology of Spirit point to more
advanced stages of recognition than the mas-
ter-slave relation, e.g. between divine law
(Hegel exemplifies this with reference to So-
phocles’ Antigone) versus human law (exem-
plified by Creon), where the family becomes
both a natural and social institution in which
recognition of its members can take place. To
be more systematic, these wider connotations
of recognition encompass three social spheres:
family, civil society and state (Hegel, 1991).
Thus recognition is both intersubjectively me-
diated and extends beyond the dyadic relation
between two agents. It can be hypothesised
that recognition is both formally granted and
something that the subject (apprentice, learner,
woman, man etc.) has to fight for in terms of
an intersubjective struggle mediated or rath-
er transformed within the above-mentioned
levels (family, civil society and state).
Recognition and learning
This section will introduce Packer and Goic-
oechea’s (2000) use of a particular notion of
recognition that relies upon Kojéve3. This ar-
ticle argues for the use of Hegel’s notion of
recognition since it is more convincing than
Kojéve’s. As mentioned in the introduction,
Packer and Goicoechea (2000) propose a
model of learning where desire and recognition
are key elements. This understanding largely
derives from Kojéve’s (1969) interpretation of
the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1977). In
short, Kojéve (1969: 40) conceives of recogni-
tion merely in terms of a desire to be desired,
where a person depends upon another person
for being confirmed as desirable. According
to this view, the other (person) is conceived
as a greedy emptiness. But the problem with
Kojéve’s (1969: 40) reading of recognition is
that it downplays Hegel’s emphasis on mutual
recognition and the sociality of becoming a
person. More specifically, Kojéve’s interpreta-
tion of recognition as desire to be desired and
the idea that humans are voids desiring to be
fulfilled ignores Hegel’s (1977; 1991) push
towards communal forms of life for instance
recognition expressed as trust in the family4.
 3 Alexander Kojéve’s (1902-1968) influential lectures
on the Phenomenology of Spirit at the Ecole Practique
des Hautes Etudes in the 1930’s were either directly at-
tended by – or at had a huge influence over – prominent
thinkers like Merlau-Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, Jacques
Lacan, Andre Breton, Georges Bataille, and Alexandre
Koyre.
 4 To be more precise there are two fundamental problems
with Kojéve’s reading of Hegel’s notion of recognition.
First, Kojéve can be criticised for an anthropological
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For these reasons Packer and Goicoechea’s
reliance upon Kojéve’s conception of recog-
nition is problematic since it gives a limited
view of the relationship between learning and
recognition as is evident in the examples Pack-
er and Goicoechea (2000) give of recognition.
They cite Felman (1987: 86; cited in Packer
and Goicoechea, 2000: 236) who points out
that teaching includes an emotional or erotic
component. They also cite Schoenfeld (1999:
13; cited in Packer and Goicoechea, 2000:
236) who points out that the teacher faces the
task of “seducing” students. Finally, Packer
and Goichoecea (2000: 238) cite Vygotsky’s
(1997a: 348) statement that the social forces
in the individual represent “a bitter struggle, 
now concealed, now explicit, between teacher 
and student.” While it is true that for Vygot-
sky (1997a: 349) the good teacher was not
objective and sober-minded, but passionate
in an “atmosphere of tense social struggle”,
these citations do not refer to the importance
of erotic desire in teaching, as Packer and
Goichoecea imply. Vygotsky (1997a: 346f)
explicitly dismisses the view that the teacher
must seduce or attract the person to be edu-
cated in order for any imitation and learning
to take place, since education was more than
imitation. It follows that it is problematic to
draw on notions of seduction in conceiving
of recognition and learning with reference to
Vygotsky.
In other words, Packer and Goichoecea
(2000) raise a valid point about learning being
reading of recognition that conceives the master-slave
relation literally as human figures (for instance merely
in antiquity or feudal rule) rather than within broader
historical institutions of mastery versus serfdom (Kelly,
1996). Second as mentioned above, Kojéve focuses nar-
rowly on treating the other as a mere object of your
desire and the struggle between agents as reconciled in
the master and slave relationship. The point is that while
Packer and Goicoechea make an important contribution
to viewing learning as clashes of desires versus loving
relationships, their focus on the master-slave relation-
ship (building on Kojéve) is insufficient.
related to relationships of struggles and love.
But it is problematic to read Hegel’s point
about love and recognition in terms of seduc-
tion. Love, according to Hegel, represents a
form of recognition that is not contingent or
conditioned upon something else as in seduc-
tion, where the other becomes a means to sat-
isfy desire, rather than someone to be recog-
nised in his/her own right. In friendship and
love, the individual’s identity is constructed
not only abstractly as a person with rights,
but also concretely as a lovable person, as in-
vestigated in the following case study of ap-
prenticeship learning.
3 Introduction to the case study
The case was a study of participants in a gold-
smith’s workshop. The purpose of the study
was to investigate how recognition mediates
the formation of persons in apprenticeship
learning. The participants of the case study
were, as mentioned in the introduction, Bent
Exner and 12 former apprentices who had
graduated from the master’s goldsmith work-
shop over more than the 35 years that he had
been active.
The master owned the workshop and he
was a well-known goldsmith who had been
popularised by the Danish mass media, won
several art stipends and exhibited his works at
a variety of Danish galleries. In 2003 he was
endowed with a yearly art stipend from the
Danish State as one of the few Danish artisans
ever to have received this. The workshop was
economically specialised and it performed only
custom works such as jewellery for private
customers or altar chalices for churches. As
opposed to most other small goldsmith work-
shops, jewellery repairs were not done in this
workshop5. There were no strict boundaries
 5 The master had run his goldsmith activities from three
different sites in the Danish countryside. This will not
be discussed in this paper since it has no great relevance
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between goldsmith craft, home and family, as
symbolised by the fact that the workshop was
built in a room adjacent to the private house
of the master.
Between one and four people at a time have
worked at the workshop in periods with no ap-
prentices. Normally the workshop employed
two apprentices (an older and a younger) and
no journeywoman, though there have also
been prolonged periods where the master em-
ployed his own graduated apprentice as a jour-
neywoman instead of taking new apprentices.
When I conducted the interviews6 (from 2002
to 2004), the workshop had stopped taking
new apprentices and it consisted of the master
(aged 71 in 2003) and a journeywoman (who,
as mentioned, was also a former apprentice).
The former apprentices had all become ac-
complished goldsmiths, though not all prac-
ticed the craft professionally: two had won
honours distinctions at graduation (the Silver
medal – the highest distinction at Vocational
school); two had won design prizes for excel-
lence; two had become teachers within further
education; one was a manager of a goldsmith
firm; four ran their own workshops, and finally
two worked as journeywomen in other distin-
guished goldsmith workshops.
to the issue of learning and recognition. Whenever this
paper quotes an “apprentice”, it technically speaking
gives voice to a “former apprentice” describing the ex-
periences and memories of once being an apprentice.
 6 All participants were individually interviewed once
and the interviews were semi structured qualitative
interviews lasting from 1 to 1,5 hour. All interviews
were conducted by the author and recorded on a mi-
ni-disc and then recorded on to a tape. An experien-
ced secretary transcribed the interviews verbatim. The
transcribed interviews cover approximately 237 single
spaced pages. All participants agreed to participate
after informed consent (written and verbal informa-
tion about the purpose of the study) and did not wish
to be anonymous. Anonymity would have prevented
the participants from the possibility of arguing against
my interpretations, or using their interview statement
for promoting personal ends such as promoting their
career.
4 To go beyond yourself to
become yourself
This section investigates the apprentices’ ap-
propriation of the standards of the workshop.
The section will argue that becoming an arti-
san involved for the apprentices to go beyond
themselves and to appropriate the standards
of the profession mediated by the master. The
section will argue three points:
1. The participants (master, apprentices and
journeywomen) had to stake their lives to
prove their autonomous status as artisans.
2. In imposing his will on the world, the mas-
ter used the apprentice as his tool, for in-
stance in the way the apprentice worked
for the master by employing artefacts and
the master’s methods and goals.
3. This gave rise to a double relationship: a)
The apprentice was on the one hand the
master’s tool, but, b) on the other hand,
since the master was the apprentice’s
means to become an artisan, the appren-
tice was his own master. The apprentice
achieved self-mastery by working for the
master. In conclusion, the apprentice in
fact mediated the master’s relation to the
world and achieved self-control by work-
ing for the master.
Staking your life and proving your
autonomy
Bent Exner: “We drive around to the characteris-
tic places. We do not start out watching jewellery,
art, and creativity or hold a lecture, not at all. We
go to Råbjerg Mile, Rubjerg Knude [sand hills in
Northern Jutland, Denmark] and walk up and down
the dune staking our lives. We go to Skarre Klit
or Vildmose [a sand dune and a moor in Northern
Jutland] to see the monotony.”
All apprentices confirmed in the interviews
that the master invited them to perceive natural
scenery rather than to engage in lengthy dis-
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cussions of art and creativity. This indicates
that learning to craft meant not only coming
to master technical skills like soldering, cut-
ting etc. gold and silver, but to relate to the
world at large. The apprentice went beyond the
confines of his or her own perspective through
acts like going outside to face danger.
This theme of the artisan staking his or her
life was also emphasised by the master in a
booklet written for one of his exhibitions:
“It is interesting to distinguish between the profes-
sional, ever-experimenting artist, who gives his life
to expressing himself – and his fellow humans, who
first become creative in and around the home, after
work, as compensation for a sometimes trivial job
[…] The former exhibits his work. Maybe he wins
prizes and becomes famous. The latter keeps […] to
himself and stays at home” (Exner, 1984: 7).
The master construes the artisan as someone
who is willing to “give his life” in the activity
of crafting. It is only the “everyday person”
who stays within his or her own safe confines
(“home”, “a trivial job”). But obviously the
artisan does not automatically receive pub-
lic recognition (“maybe he wins prizes and
becomes famous”), but recognition is contin-
gent upon the artisan going beyond herself to
prove her autonomy. This theme of autonomy
is elaborated in the following:
Bent Exner: “I craft a thing and they [the custom-
ers] do not have to receive it if they do not want
it – if it is astray. But I must have the liberty to use
my things at my own art exhibitions. Otherwise I
become a whore”.
Interviewer: “In the sense that you hold back
in order to make an exhibition or that you call
it back or ask them if you can borrow it for an
exhibition?
Bent Exner: “You bet, otherwise I start mak-
ing what Ms. Smith wants. And I preach to them
a little bit about…or how should I put it…tell
them about my experiences with jewellery: That
jewellery originally was intended solely as gifts
to the Gods or to the dead in the graves. It was
never intended for use. In fact jewellery cannot
be used. It is a soft metal attracted to soap, dust
and dirt. Therefore there are limits as to the use
of jewellery.”
The quote deals with the master’s “sales talk”
to customers. The master was engaged in a
dialogue with his customers that served to per-
suade them that he was an autonomous artisan.
As opposed to succumbing to the desire of the
average private customer (“Ms Smith”) the
master insisted on his autonomy (“liberty”)
to decide what to produce. He also insisted
on maintaining the rights over the produced
artefacts even though they were formally sold.
This way the master claimed to have removed
capital from the relation between the master
and his customers – in order not to become a
“whore”.
To recapitulate, by telling his customers
that he was solely responsible for the craft and
symbolically a lifelong owner of the product,
the master upheld an image of himself as a free
artisan who only produced for himself accord-
ing to universal standards of the craft and not
primarily to satisfy the customers’ particular
desires.
Artefacts
Interviewer: “If you think back upon your ap-
prenticeship can you describe your daily work
chores?”
Trine: “[…] He made a sketch. A very delicate
little drawing that you talked a little about and
went ahead with. It was not a very precise draw-
ing with measurements; it was more of an im-
pression – in other words an expression – that
he sought for. And then you went ahead. It was
usually in eighteen-carat gold and very delicate,
fine and light things. And then you basically
worked on it and perhaps you made a model first
and some drawings. Well, you had to specify the
drawing a little bit in terms of dealing with the
technical and how it all fitted together. Typically,
I think that we worked two to three weeks on a
jewellery.”
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The quote shows that the master designed the
artefacts by making a sketch on a piece of
paper. The sketches were handed to the ap-
prentices who carried out the actual work.
It was up to the apprentices to interpret the
master’s intentions in order to determine the
thickness of the ring, the number of places that
the jewellery had been soldered etc. In other
words, the apprentice could not create out of
his own fancy, but followed the master’s inten-
tions with the goldsmith artefacts.
But the sketches also acted as communica-
tion tools. The master would normally not have
to explain in any greater detail to the senior ap-
prentice (who had been in the workshop at least
one year) how the sketches should be inter-
preted, but with the junior apprentice he would
often have a short conversation about how to
interpret the sketches. In order to interpret
the master’s intentions and craft the artefacts,
the apprentice had to engage in dialogue with
the master about the artistic expression of the
workshop. By engaging with the sketches as
well as the dialogues with the master over ar-
tistic expression, the apprentice was in a sense
led to become “an other” than what she was.
Here externalisation refers to a transforma-
tion from one level of subjectivity to another
level, the intersubjective. The term should be
used as a metaphor for agency rather than a
dualistic notion of inner worlds being trans-
formed into outer or vice versa. The point is
that the apprentice worked not out of her own
particular desires, but went beyond herself.
The master became an other – he lost himself
so to speak – when his designs were external-
ised and taken over by the apprentice. In this
process the apprentice was transformed (sub-
lated) in the sense that she became someone
(a recognised person – not just anybody) to
the master through whom he could experience
his own self (his desires, plans etc.) – a tool
and somebody in her own right. The master
regained self-certainty – that he was in fact
an autonomous person – when the apprentice
was recognised concretely by the master not
only as a tool, but another autonomous per-
son who worked not to satisfy her own desire.
The result was that by working for the master
(working from the master’s sketches within a
historical craft tradition embodied in a com-
munity of practice), the apprentice was appro-
priating an impersonal attitude to the world.
But this act of externalisation could only be
performed to the extent that the master could
prove himself right to the apprentice, for in-
stance as a role model or by demonstrating
not only his skills but also his moral worth as
a craftsman. The master did this by express-
ing the high ideals of the workshop. In sum,
in working for the master and in using his
sketches, the apprentice satisfied the master’s
desire and externalised the master’s intentions.
Externalisation thus referred to the process of
confrontation with another, cancellation of
yourself and cancellation of other in the pro-
cess of going beyond yourself, i.e. personality
development or person formation.
These notions of desire, cancellation and
externalisation are not lofty speech metaphors;
they are relevant to underpin the process of
becoming a craft person through struggles for
recognition. This process was expressed for
instance in the fact that it was the master who
was recognised publicly in terms of all fin-
ished objects (jewellery etc.). This was seen
in two ways:
1. All goldsmith works (artefacts) put on dis-
play or sold by Exner were represented and
categorised as his work. During the inter-
views, when time permitted it, I gave the
former apprentice one of Exner’s (1984)
books on his works, and asked the partici-
pants to comment on the jewellery. Ba-
sically all apprentices recognised several
works that they had done, but they never
claimed ownership over the jewellery, just
a sense of pride that they had produced
it.
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2. Bent Exner was, like other Danish gold-
smiths who were chartered by the Danish
goldsmith association, granted the right
to mark his craftwork. Marking means to
put your name/initials on all artefacts leav-
ing the workshop. The fact that the mas-
ter marked his name on the artefacts that
were sold to private persons or shown at art
exhibitions symbolises that only the mas-
ter – not the apprentice – had the right of
ownership over the jewellery.
To rephrase the point: As a property-owning
craftsman Exner marked all produced goods in
his workshop and thus received public recog-
nition from everything produced. The master
saw his will imposed on the world mediated by
the apprentices (as discussed above in terms
of sketches). And the apprentices mediated
the master’s relation to the world since they
satisfied the master’s desires and thus also me-
diated the master’s relation to himself. The
master’s impersonal point of view in the mas-
ter-apprentice relation led to a form of mastery
on behalf of the apprentice. This gave rise to
a double relationship: The apprentice was the
master’s tool, but since the master was the
apprentice’s means to become an artisan, the
apprentice was his own master. In other words,
the apprentice achieved self-control by work-
ing for the master.
Mastery meant both to be a technically
skilled craftsman, but also to master the craft
and your self. Through this type of mastery
the master mediated the apprentices’ relation
to themselves by making them masters them-
selves (letting them work hard for him and
hereby work for themselves, of letting the ap-
prentices appropriate his norms). Mastery was
appropriated by the apprentices as a norm or
more importantly as a tool of learning to con-
trol your self. But it was also externalised as
a technically skilled artisan and as a way of
behaving responsibly towards the workshop.
Through externalisation, the apprentice was
recognised by the master not only as some-
one who carried out the master’s plans, but
more importantly as someone who worked not
to satisfy his own desire. By working for the
master, the apprentice appropriated an imper-
sonal attitude on the world. This (externalisa-
tion) could only be performed to the extent
that the master could prove himself right to the
apprentice for instance by being a role model.
In this sense the master’s (personal) leading
motive was the (collective) leading motive of
the workshop community engaged in crafting
activity.
5 Abstract and concrete
recognition
As mentioned in the beginning, Hegel makes a
distinction between recognition of somebody’s
concrete personality versus abstract personal-
ity. This was a distinction between concretely
recognising a person through love and friend-
ship (e.g. within the family) versus abstractly
recognising the person’s legal rights (within
civil society).
Abstract recognition
How were the participants recognised abstract-
ly as persons? According to Hegel the notion
of legal rights is based on the fact that the per-
son is a property owner. But if it was only the
master who was owner of the workshop how
did abstract recognition play a role? First as
Danish citizens the apprentices were granted
civil rights or abstract recognition like any
other Danish citizen. Second the apprentices
were under the law of apprenticeship7. The
following example is about wage:
 7 The contemporary version of this law (“Bekendtgørelse
af lov om erhvervsuddannelser” number 183 of 22nd
March 2004) grants the apprentice certain rights like
a 3 months’ trial period and a wage (which amounts at
least to a minimum wage) paid by the workshop as spe-
cified in the apprentice’s apprenticeship agreement.
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Bent Exner: “And I give her [the journeywoman] a
higher wage than I get. I would not dream of doing
it otherwise. After all, it is not her workshop, so she
does not have the pleasure that I have. So she must
earn more. She earns as much as a school principal.
[…] Because the human being is still present in me
together with the honour of my profession and the
honour of my own place. Here the jewellery must
be in order, the ethics must be in order and we must
have a good time, in order to be happy for life. Not
that we sit around laughing”.
The quote illustrates the sense of honour that
the master felt for his place and that he aimed
to install in his apprentices and journeywomen.
But the quote also illustrates that the master
economically compensated his journeywoman
since she did not own the workshop and there-
fore could not assert her abstract right as a
workshop owner. As mentioned earlier (in the
section on artefacts) only the workshop owner
had the right to mark his works and this was a
significant action in craftwork that was imbued
with recognition. While the apprentices could
not take possession of the works produced in
the workshop they said that the master’s name
and reputation could be used to “open doors”
in the craft world. In this sense the apprentices
could use the master’s/workshop’s name as a
strategy to seize upon recognition.
The above quote leaves open what the mas-
ter means by having a good time, but the quote
suggests that it entails more than receiving a
good wage, but also an enjoyment of working,
though never at the expense of hard, earnest
work (“not that we sit [idly] around laugh-
ing”). The next section will look at issue of
concrete recognition and the significance of
friendship between master and apprentice to
learning.
Concrete recognition
In Hegel, love is an example of mutual rec-
ognition and it assumes an unconditional rela-
tionship between two persons based on mutu-
ality, where the giver is also the receiver and
vice versa. Love is normally associated with
the family, for instance between husband and
wife or parent and children, but can also en-
compass friendship.
Apprenticeship learning at Exner’s work-
shop exhibited many features of recognition
that entailed relations of friendship and love.
This included life long bonds – stretching sev-
eral decades – between former apprentices and
master. For instance, when the master celebrat-
ed his 70th birthday a few years ago all former
apprentices showed up except for two who
were ill: “There was no problem [in the ap-
prentices showing up] because we have a fel-
lowship of the heart” (the master). The master
was rightly proud that after up to 35 years his
former apprentices were still willing to travel
up to his workshop in Northern Jutland and
celebrate his birthday.
Thus being an apprentice in Exner’s work-
shop entailed being part of the family, includ-
ing privileges like dining with the family and
duties like helping out with the basic needs,
cleaning, changing nappies on the kids etc.:
there was no sharp separation between produc-
ing artefacts and participating in the family.
Also, the apprentices were engaged in vari-
ous boundary-crossing activities: “We would 
go hunting, also in the middle of the working 
day, when time permitted it” (the master). The
apprentices confirmed how they together with
the master and journeywoman had worked
jointly for instance to set up art exhibitions
but also about recreational activities such as
going to the beach in the summer, going hunt-
ing in autumn, ice-skating or sweating in the
sauna in winter etc.
In short, the apprentice generally experi-
enced being part of the family and this was
significant because as a member of the work-
shop/family you were treated with respect and
your actions did not conjure up humiliation (as
could for instance be involved in carrying out
menial tasks like emptying dustbins or clean-
ing toilets) since the apprentice did not do such
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work only for the master but for the commu-
nity of practice and therefore also for oneself
as a family member. The point is that in friend-
ship, the master and apprentice were more than
mere objects to each other. This sense of re-
spect is illustrated in the following.
Marianne: “Well when you are kind of part of the
family, which I think we were, you learn: that is
the way he [the master] wants it. And that is how it
should be. And if it [the craft product] is all right,
you get something in return. And that is an impor-
tant thing, I think, that you learn that you also have
to contribute to this.”
Interviewer: “And in return what do you
receive?”
Marianne: “Well you get a greater joy out of
working and you receive praise, when you have
done something properly. And you get the reward
that you can see that it has led somewhere and
you also learn yourself to see: well, that is right,
things have to look nice, it must be clean here,
otherwise it does not work.”
The interview excerpt points to the fact that
becoming a member of the community includ-
ed being integrated both in the workshop and
the family. The interview quotation also indi-
cates that the apprentice took over the mas-
ter’s standards (for instance in regards to a
clean workshop) and experienced a reward (a
joy of working) as she fulfilled these demands
and when she saw that she fulfilled them. This
appropriation hinges on the fact that the ap-
prentice found it worthwhile to work for the
master and hereby could gain mutual recog-
nition. There are many quotations in the re-
search interviews with the participants where
the apprentices recounted stories about dining,
going to the movie theatre or the beach with
the master and his family. And these personal
relations would often last for many years after
the apprentices had finished their apprentice-
ship. This can be interpreted in terms of the
master recognising the apprentices as concrete
persons, in terms of close personal relations
and as signs of the apprentices achieving a
double-membership in the workshop commu-
nity as well as in the master’s family.
The relation between master and apprentice
could often become based on genuine recipro-
cal respect. The master stated:
Bent Exner: “The apprentices [were] dear friends
[who] drove the children to music lessons etc. They
got a chat with the children at the same time. And
an apprentice who has a driver’s license is proud.
He drives in the master’s car or rather just the car,
because they were allowed to use the car if I was
not using it: ‘here you go’.”
The apprentices helped out in the family. In
return for their commitment in the family (and
the workshop of course) they would be re-
warded materially in terms of being allowed
to borrow the car or personally in terms of
friendship with the master. The link between
workshop and family was also stated meta-
phorically: “Therefore they [the apprentices] 
do not receive exactly the same treatment. The 
reason is that if you love your children and 
you have many children, you do not treat them 
equally” (the master). The master evokes the
metaphor of children in describing his rela-
tion to his apprentices. The significance of the
statement lies in the possibility that the master
recognised his apprentices not only abstractly
as persons with certain legal rights, but more
importantly as concrete persons – each dif-
ferent from the other. There is evidence that
there was a high degree of mutual recognition
between the participants in the workshop.
To sum up, the themes of love, family and
friendship were interwoven in the statements of
the participants and the significance for learn-
ing lies in its over-personal sense, whereby the
master is not simply a man with random desires
and standpoints as to his liking and disliking
of objects and selves (e.g. of what artefacts to
produce or what personality characteristics to
look for in good apprentices), but the expert
master impersonating the high craft standards.
The participants sat the standards and were sat
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by the standards and engaged in dialogue for
instance about artistic expression, about strug-
gling with yourself to maintain high technical
standards or going beyond yourself in demon-
strating your sacrifice for the craft.
6 Discussion
This article has argued that the notion of
recognition serves to underpin sociocultural
approaches to learning by weaving together
self and other in the processes of self mastery
and person formation mediated not abstract-
ly by cultural tools alone, but concretely by
everyday struggles whereby each aimed to be
taken as an autonomous or self-independent
person. The article has investigated a case of
apprenticeship where participation and learn-
ing were interpreted as mirroring struggles for
recognition.
As argued, Hegel’s notion of recognition
can throw light upon the intersubjective di-
mensions of learning and development. This
article makes a case that a narrow focus on
dyadic relationships should be overcome. An
understanding of recognition in terms of dy-
adic relationships casts the category merely
in terms of two agents for instance apprentice
and master struggling for respect etc. This un-
derstanding lends much from the conception
of the master-slave relation, which as men-
tioned earlier is only the most rudimentary
form of recognition. In itself there is nothing
wrong in studying learning in terms of say
a student desiring to appropriate some learn-
ing material for instance to achieve some in-
strumental end towards an object, or a teacher
suppressing a student, or two learners collabo-
rating on collective learning tasks or the stu-
dents’ motivation to obtain better grades or
the role of seduction, attraction etc. between
student and teacher. But it is more fruitful to
conceive of the link between learning and rec-
ognition in terms of social struggles between
institutions or indeed classes played out within
intersubjective relations and communities of
practices.
While this social struggle has potential ram-
ifications for the way people live their every-
day lives, Hegel’s notion of recognition can-
not be used pre-reflexively or by picking out
a couple of citations to borrow Vygotsky’s
(1997b: 330) point about applying Marx’ no-
tions as reified categories ready to explain the
empirical world. For instance, the issue of life
and death struggle to Hegel (1807/1977: 114)
was a necessary logical movement towards mu-
tual recognition (since as argued it requires that
the agents stake their lives to prove that they
are autonomous). There is not a direct relation-
ship between this logical level of a philosophy
and the empirical level – while Hegel’s notion
of recognition posits a life and death struggle
and the master slave relation we cannot infer
that education or curriculum should be built
on the idea that students should engage in such
struggle or institutions. But to say that there is
no direct link is not to say that there is no link:
on the one hand Hegel’s notion of recognition
depicts a logical system, and on the other hand
it is preconditioned upon a historical develop-
ment that has made social institutions (like the
family or goldsmith apprenticeship) possible.
This article has tried to demonstrate that ap-
prenticeship learning was temporally situated
in the institution of apprenticeship and in the
everyday, continuous, contemporary struggle
for recognition associated with learning and
development. But the point is that a sociocul-
tural (or cultural historical activity or situated)
account of learning has to create its own mean-
ing of the essence of the phenomenon of rec-
ognition, not merely borrow Hegel’s.
Person formation and personality develop-
ment are both terms used in this paper (and it
would lead too far here to differentiate these
terms from each other or from identity de-
velopment), but what is the relation between
recognition and formation of persons? As
mentioned, Hegel conceived of the formation
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of person and reason as fundamentally social
and as coming into being through recognition
(Pinkard, 1996). This implies that forms of
recognition depend on interactions between
people. To recognise someone plus being rec-
ognised either “formally” (in terms of title or
status) or “informally” (e.g. in terms of ap-
preciation) connotes, as mentioned above, a
double-relation. This double-relation refers not
so much to the act of granting plus receiving
as to the resulting relation that the agent gets
to an other and to him- or herself, in other
words to the formation of the other and him- or
herself. Recognition carries an attributing and
a receptive meaning through which the agents
achieve a doubling of their relations to each
other and to themselves. Thus recognition is
not only the accomplishment of the agent in
terms of satisfying someone’s desire through
praise, admiration etc.; recognition also has a
receptive side. The receptive side is expressed
as a human right and something perceived or
experienced by the subject.
Even though cultural historical psychology8
has formulated ideas about personality devel-
opment, the logical steps leading to person
formation have not been sufficiently spelled
out in connection with Hegel’s notion of rec-
ognition. In spite of his familiarity with He-
gel’s philosophy, Vygotsky (1998: 171) only
very indirectly touched upon the notion of
 8 Cultural historical psychology has generally not de-
veloped the notion of recognition. Vygotsky’s (1978:
57) point about the transformation of an interpersonal
process into an intrapersonal (the genetic law of de-
velopment), points to the importance of intersubjec-
tive relations for higher psychological functions not
recognition as such. As argued by Lektorsky (1999: 66)
Leontiev did not explicate the meaning of intersubjec-
tive relations. However, Álvarez and del Río (1999: 305)
have investigated the importance of recognition in con-
nection with personality development, and conceive of
recognition as “a deeper reflexive process of accepting
identity concerning a symbiotic unit of oneself (relation
with ourselves)” (p.305). Unfortunately, Álvarez and del
Río do not elaborate on this definition or on whether it
has any references to Hegel’s notion of the term.
recognition in developing the concept of the
“formation of the personality” to cases “only
when there is mastery of the person’s own be-
haviour.” In trying to explain how learning can
be understood as a change in relations between
an individual and the world due to change in
the learner’s capacity for using tools and in-
terpreting artefacts, to use Hedegaard’s (2002)
definition, it would be necessary to view the
learner in the world in terms of acts of grant-
ing and being granted personhood. And these
relations could be hypothesised to mirror a
struggle for recognition in the sense that the
changing relations of learner-world are contin-
gent upon the learner being able to recognise
others and be recognised by others.
7 Conclusion
According to Hegel, self-determination was
mediated through recognition, which was fun-
damentally social. When applying Hegel’s no-
tion of recognition to learning we cannot ig-
nore that recognition springs from more than
a single self-consciousness’ emptiness want-
ing to devour the desire of another self-con-
sciousness. A first step in transcending this
dyadic understanding could be to view acts
of recognition in terms of communal agents
acting within communities of practice, like
goldsmith apprenticeship. This step might
demonstrate that recognition holds the prom-
ise of theoretically underpinning the move-
ments leading from one-way recognition (as
in the mastery-slavery institution) to mutual
recognition, and beyond dyadic relationships
in terms of communities struggling for rights
and recognition.
In investigating craft apprenticeship and
the union of family and workshop, this article
has offered a hypothesis as to the process of
personality development mediated by recog-
nition of the other as an apprentice, master
and even friend or family member. The article
has argued that the meaning of the concept of
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recognition discussed in this article goes much
beyond verbal praise, feedback and seduction.
The article has linked learning with notions of
person formation by pointing to recognition
of somebody’s abstract and concrete person-
ality. Recognition is an essential analytical
category, which can explain the construction
of identities on the concrete level as love and
friendship between people and abstractly, on
the political level in terms of granting rights,
securing higher wages for the journeywoman
etc. Apart from the difficulties in applying
a philosophical category to a contemporary
social practice there seems to be every good
reason to investigate how recognition explains
how and why somebody might learn and de-
velop through some forms of participation.
Recognition is not only an analytical con-
cept, but also a normative concept that should
be worked out in concrete practice and thus
the notion points to an ideal, namely to foster
the conditions for mutual recognition. This
requires a sociocultural approach to recogni-
tion and learning on intersubjective and insti-
tutional levels of analysis and practice.
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